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A Video Steganography Attack Using 
Multi-Dimensional Discrete Spring Transform 
Aaron Sharp, Qilin Qi, Yaoqing Yang, Dongming Peng, and Hamid Sharif 
Abstract-Video steganography is fast emerging as a next­
generation steganographic medium that ofTers many advantages 
over traditional steganographic cover media such as audio and 
images. Various schemes have recently emerged which take 
advantage of video specific properties for information hiding, 
most notably through the use of motion vectors. Although many 
steganographic schemes have been proposed which exploit several 
possible steganographic domains within video sequences, few 
attacks have been proposed to combat such schemes, and no 
current attacks have been shown to be capable of defeating 
multiple schemes at once. 
In this paper, we will further expand upon our proposed 
Discrete Spring Transform (DST) steganographic attack. We will 
explore further applications of the transform and how it may be 
used to defeat multiple steganographic schemes, specifically cur­
rent video steganography schemes. The effectiveness of the pro­
posed algorithm will be shown by attacking a multi-dimensional 
steganographic algorithm embedded in video sequences, where 
the scheme operates in two different dimensions of the video. The 
attack is successful in defeating multiple steganographic schemes 
verified by determining the BER after DST attack which always 
remains approximately 0.5. Furthermore, the attack preserves the 
integrity of the video sequence which is verified by determining 
the PSNR which always remains approximately above 30dB. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Digital Steganography is often considered a game of cat and 
mouse between steganographer and attacker, where the two are 
constantly at odds attempting to defeat each other. In the last 
several decades, the capacity and prevalence of steganographic 
cover media has increased dramatically almost entirely as a 
direct result of the free exchange of media via the internet. 
Websites such as Facebook and Flickr are estimated to host 
approximately 100 billion and 6 billion images respectively 
[1] and Youtube is estimated to host approximately 13 billion 
videos [2]. As a result, steganographic attacks that can be ap­
plied to a variety of algorithms and cover media are becoming 
increasingly important since the sea of potential cover media 
is becoming so incredibly vast. 
Although countless steganographic attacks have be proposed 
to combat a variety of steganographic algorithms [3], [4], [5], 
[6], very few attacks are flexible enough to be used outside of 
a limited set of algorithms and are typically highly-specialized 
to defeat certain types of steganographic algorithms. For exam­
ple, we consider the attacks described [3], [4], [5], [6] which 
defeat image-steganography, and more specifically, jpeg-based 
steganography. None of the attacks found in these surveys 
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indicate that they are capable of defeating other types of 
image-based steganography, such as spatial techniques, and 
even worse none of these attacks appear to be adaptable to 
other types of jpeg steganography. It follows that the rigidity 
of these attacks is due to the nature of the attack itself, 
where nearly all proposed attacks fall into the passive warden 
classification as described by the prisoner problem. 
The prisoner problem is used to describe steganographic 
attacks where attacks fall into one of two categories: passive 
warden and active warden. The prisoner problem describes the 
process of two prisoners attempting to communicate secretly 
by sending hidden messages through a warden [7], [4], [3]. 
The warden's responsibility is to discover andlor destroy the 
hidden message. A passive warden attack describes the sce­
nario where the warden monitors messages and only acts if the 
message appears to contain hidden data [4], [3]. Conversely, 
an active warden attack describes the scenario where the 
warden actively attempts to destroy or uncover the hidden data, 
regardless of the appearance of the message [4], [3]. 
The problem with passive warden attacks is that they 
are most often highly specific to a certain steganographic 
algorithms within a specific type of cover media [4], [3]. It is 
typically the case that such attacks look at certain attributes 
of the cover media to determine if a certain algorithm has 
been used or if the statistics of the cover media have been 
disturbed in a manner that suggests steganographic data is 
present [8], [9]. It is clear to see that such attacks would be 
ineffective against those algorithms or cover media which have 
not been fully studied, as it is impossible to predict attributes 
of unknown attacks. For this reason, we believe that the 
only truly adaptable steganographic attacks utilize the active 
warden model. We have previously described the Discrete 
Spring Transform (DST) which is an active warden attack 
that is capable of disrupting next-generation steganographic 
algorithms [10]. In this paper, we intend to further expand 
upon the DST attack and demonstrate how it may be further 
applied to other next-generation steganographic schemes. 
The paper is described as follows: Previous Works, which 
briefly introduces the Discrete Spring Transform and Video 
Steganography; System Architecture and Methodology, which 
mathematically describes further applications of the Discrete 
Spring Transform and its applications; Video Steganography, 
which describes in detail the specifics of a multi-dimensional 
steganography scheme in video sequences; Simulation Results, 
which determines the results of the attack on video steganog­
raphy; Conclusion, which describes the success of the attack 
and further observations. 
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II. PREVIOUS WORKS 
Previous works for this paper focus on the discussion of 
Discrete Spring Transform (DST) and video steganograhy. 
A. Discrete Spring Transform 
We have previously described an active warden attack 
called the Discrete Spring Transform (DST) [10]. The attack 
utilizes spatial transforms to non-linearly distort cover media 
in a manner that destroys hidden steganographic data while 
preserving the integrity of the cover media. The definition 
of DST allows it to be applied to any type of stegrano­
graphic algorithm and cover media, which means that DST 
offers an extremely flexible and adaptable attack to combat 
next-generation steganography. It has been previously shown 
that DST may be applied to next-generation steganography 
(specifically to combat motion vector steganography) while 
preserving the integrity of the cover media. We intend to 
further expand the applications of DST to include a more 
generalized attack for video steganography. 
B. Video Steganography 
While video steganography is a relatively new stegano­
graphic medium, there have been some interesting schemes 
proposed which encode information in multiple domains of 
video sequences. Most of these techniques fall into one of 
three categories: 2-dimensional encoding, 3-dimensional en­
coding, and multi-dimensional encoding. 
1) 2-Dimensional Video Steganography: 2-Dimensional 
video steganography refers to any techniques which may be 
used to encode information within individual frames of a 
video sequence using image-based steganography, example 
algorithms may be found in [11], [12], [13]. Since these tech­
niques only operate 2-dimensionally within individual frames 
of the video sequence, the term 2-dimensional steganography 
is appropriate. There is nothing gained over image normal 
image-based steganography from using this technique as the 
strength of the algorithms are not enhanced when applied to 
video. 
2) 3-Dimensional Video Steganography: 3-dimensional 
video steganography refers to techniques which attempt to 
encode information using a third dimension of the video 
sequence, such as time or motion vectors. 
With time-based steganography, information may be spread 
in time by altering only certain frames, or sections of frames 
within a video sequence using image-based steganography. 
The advantage to this approach is that only a fraction of the 
possible frames and data are encoded, making steganographic 
attacks difficult since most of the video sequence will not 
contain any steganographic data. As a result, many stegano­
graphic attacks that take advantage of predefined statistics 
within image or video sequences would likely fail since the 
encoded video largely retains the same metrics as the original 
sequence. 
Motion vector steganography encodes information within 
the motion vectors of a video sequence typically by inter­
cepting the motion estimation block (as found in popular 
2 
video compression algorithms) and altering motion vectors 
in a certain way [14], [15], [16], [17]. This technique uti­
lizes motion between frames which is also considered a 3-
dimensional medium for encoding. This attack is unique in 
that it takes advantage of a video-specific medium to encode 
information, meaning that image-based steganographic attacks 
are inadequate to defeat this type of steganography. Currently, 
the only observed attacks in literature are passive warden 
attacks that are specific to motion vector steganography [18], 
[19]. 
3) Multi-Dimensional Video Steganography: Multi-
dimensional video steganography refers to a combination 
of 2-Dimensional and 3-Dimensional video steganography. 
Multi-dimensional steganography can simultaneously encode 
information in both the 3D and 2D sections of video, resulting 
in an extremely large capacity for steganographic data. In 
fact, often both techniques can be encoded independently of 
each other, meaning it is possible to encode two different 
sequences of information in two different domains of the 
video simultaneously. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of 
how 2D and 3D video steganography can both be applied to 
a video sequence. In this sample scheme, each frame of the 
video is encoded using standard image-based steganography 
(this frame is called the IFrame). Next, the next frame in 
the sequence (called the PFrame) is used to perform motion 
estimation from the IFrame. The PFrame is altered using 
motion-vector steganography to encode information. The 
cycle is then repeated by advancing the sequence using 
the PFrame as the new IFrame. The result of this type of 
encoding is that there is no current steganographic attack that 
can simultaneously address the 2D and 3D encoding in the 
video sequence. For this reason, we have chosen to attack 
multi-dimensional video steganography using our multi­
dimensional DST to show how our attack can simultaneously 
defeat two different types of steganography schemes. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHIT ECTURE AND MET HODOLOGY 
We will now formally describe the definition of Discrete 
Spring Transform and some sample applications for specific 
types of cover media. The definition of the Discrete Spring 
Transform is independent of any specific steganographic al­
gorithm and can be applied to any type of cover media in 
n-dimensional space. 
A. Discrete Spring Transform 
Let C be an n-dimensional cover media defined as: 
C = F(x , y , z ,  ... ) (1) 
where 
x , y , z , ... E Z (2) 
and the number of parameters in F(x, y, z, ... ) is n. 
Then the Discrete Spring Transform for a cover media C 
and attacked cover media 6 may be described as follows: 
C = F (x , y ,  z ,  ... ) -+ AF ( lax J , l by J , l cz J , . . .  ) = 6 (3) 
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Fig. 1. Video Steganography Encoding 
and A, a, b, c, . . .  � 1 and are defined as: 
A=JI(x , y , z ,  ... ) 
a = f2(x , y ,  z ,  ... ) 
b = h(x , y ,  z ,  ... ) (4) 
c = f4(X , y ,  z ,  ... ) 
... = fn(x , y ,  z ,  ... ) 
The strength of the Discrete Spring Transform lies in the 
definition of fn(x , y ,  z ,  ... ), which we define as any non-linear 
and time-variant function. Unlike simple RST transforms, the 
non-linearity of the DST is applied to each dimension of the 
image. 
B. DST for Image Media 
Define an M x N pixel gray-scale image I as a cover media 
I = F(x , y), where the number of pixels in x is M, and the 
number of pixels in y is N. 
The DST is then realized as: 
1= F(x , y) -t AF(laxJ , lbyJ) = j (5) 
where A, a, b are defined as: 
A = JI(x , y) 
a=f2(x , y) 
b=h(x , y) 
(6) 
and fn(x , y) is any non-linear time-variant function. 
C. DST for Video Media 
Define an M x N x F video (consisting of a sequence of F 
M x N gray-scale images) as a cover media V = F(x , y ,  z), 
where the number of pixels in x is M, the number of pixels 
in y is N, and the number of frames is F. 
The DST is then realized as: 
V = F(x , y , z) -t AF(laxJ , lbyJ , lczJ ) = V (7) 
where A, a, b, c are defined as: 
A = JI(x , y , z) 
a = f2(x , y , z) 
b=h(x , y , z) 
c = f4(X , y ,  z) 
and fn(x , y ,  z) is any non-linear time-variant function. 
IV. VIDEO STEGANOGRAPHY AT TACK 
(8) 
As other steganographers have observed, video steganog­
raphy is fast becoming an interesting new steganographic 
medium which has enormous capacity compared with tradi­
tional steganographic cover mediums [14], [15], [16], [17], 
[11]. For this reason, we have chosen to apply our multi­
dimensional DST attack to video steganography. We have 
chosen to attack a scheme which encodes information in 
multiple steganographic domains of the video sequence, us­
ing image-based steganography and motion-vector steganog­
raphy. Figure 1 describes the process of encoding informa­
tion in the video sequence where information is encoded 2-
dimensionally within individual frames of the video, as well 
as 3-dimensionally within the motion vectors of the video. We 
believe this scheme represents a robust system that would be 
exceptionally difficult to combat using existing steganographic 
attacks. 
Our attack will utilize 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks to 
combat the multi-dimensional video steganography scheme. 
Figure 2 describes the process of attacking the video sequence 
as follows: First, the video sequence is decomposed into a train 
of 2D images or frames. Next each frame of the sequence is 
attacked using the 2D DST transform. Lastly, this resultant 
sequence is attacked using the Time (3D) DST attack. The 
semantics of the 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks are described 
in the following sections. 
A. 2D DST Attack 
The 2-dimensional DST attack has been previously de­
scribed in [10], where the attack was applied to individual 
frames of a video sequence. The 2D DST attack can more 
generally be defined as an operation which will spatially distort 
media that can be expressed 2-dimensionally using a nonlinear 
spatial transform. Various algorithms may be applied which fit 
the criteria of a 2D DST attack, however, for simplicity we 
will focus on attacking the media using a 'pinch' attack, where 
individual sections of two-dimensional media are stretched and 
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Fig. 2. O ST Video Steganography Attack 
I 
other sections are compressed. The net effect of this nonlinear 
spatial attack is that the media retains some slight distortion 
but is effective in destroying most hidden steganographic 
data while maintaining an acceptable PSNR. This attack has 
been proven to be effective at combating complicated cover 
media such as video sequences, and will be part of the multi­
dimensional Spring attack. 
B. DST Time Attack 
The DST Time attack is in principle identical to the 2D 
DST attack but is implemented in the third dimension of the 
steganographic media rather than the second dimension. It is 
understood that this attack can only be applied to those types 
of cover-media which exhibit at least three dimensions, such 
as video sequences. For a video sequence, this attack can be 
thought of as affecting the time or framerate, hence the title 
DST Time attack. Figure 3 describes the process of a simple 
DST Time attack, where a video sequence is first arbitrarily 
split into two video sequences. Next, each of these sequences 
is stretched or compressed via 3-dimensional interpolation in 
the time dimension. The result is that the number of frames in 
one sequence is decreased while the number of frames in the 
other sequence is increased. The resulting sequences are then 
combined to form a video sequence that has the same number 
of frames as the original sequence. This attack will be applied 
as part of the multi-dimensional Spring attack. 
4 
Original Video Sequence 
Time Expansion 
� Time DST Attack � Video Sequence 
.. / / /J 
Fig. 3. O ST Time Attack 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
/��j/" 
The results of our multi-dimensional DST attack indi­
cate that our attack is successful in destroying the hidden 
steganographic data while maintaining acceptable quality of 
the cover-media. The BER for both the 2D and motion vector 
steganography schemes were calculated separately according 
to the strength of the 2D and Time DST attack. 
A. 2D DST BER 
Table I shows the BER for the 2D steganographic scheme 
under the multi-dimensional DST attack. As evident, the BER 
of the 2D steganographic scheme was increased dramatically 
with the 2D and Time DST attack. The table indicates that 
the 2D DST attack was much more successful in destroying 
the steganographic media than was the Time DST attack, 
however, even for a modest 2D DST attack the BER increases 
to approximately 0.5 which is shown in highlight. 
20 Chop (pixels) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Q. 0 0.0003 0. 1020 0.5351 0.5195 0.5 185 0.461 1  0 5 0.0006 0. 1033 0.5364 0.5214 0.5077 0.453 1 ..c u� 10 0.00 10 0. 1043 0.54 18 0.5236 0.5086 0.4557 '" 15 0.00 10 0. 1052 0.5402 0.5293 0.5140 0.4534 '" E E " 20 0.00 10 0. 1043 0.5450 0.5332 0.5057 0.4544 �e 25 0.00 13 0. 1087 0.5421 0.5360 0.5061 0.4585 
TABLE I 
20 STEGANOGRAPHY BER 
B. Time (3D) DST BER 
Table II shows the BER for the motion vector scheme 
under the multi-dimensional DST attack. It can be seen that 
the BER of the 3D steganographic scheme was increased 
significantly under either the 2D or Time DST attack. Unlike 
the 2D steganographic scheme, both the 2D and Time DST 
attacks were equally successful in combating the motion 
vector steganography, as evidenced by the fact both schemes 
successfully increase the BER to 0.5 dB. 
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2D Chop (pixels) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
0- 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.389 1 0.4713 0.5161  0.5 146 0 5 0.5197 0.5257 0.5106 0.5338 0.4970 0.50 15 ..c: 
U-;;;- to 0.5423 0.5302 0.5474 0.4945 0.5121  0.5287 " 15 0.4990 0.5318 0.5484 0.5378 0.5484 0.5237 <!) E E '" 20 0.5302 0.5635 0.518 1 0.5297 0.5297 0.5 156 E=S 25 0.5514 0.5559 0.54 13 0.5398 0.4950 0.5 186 
TABLE II 
MOTION VECTOR STEGANOGRAPHY BER 
C. Cover Media Quality 
Table III shows the PSNR for the video sequence under the 
multi-dimensional DST attack. The results indicate that the 
PSNR was acceptable for all tested DST transforms, where the 
PSNR always remains close to 30dB. The optimal transform 
widths for these schemes were indicated by the shaded cell 
in each of the three tables, where the 2D DST Chop was 20 
pixels and the Time (3D) DST Chop was 10 frames. 
2D Chop (pixels) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
0- 0 CXl 30.887 29.686 29.339 29. 144 29.018 0 5 34.250 30. 136 29.377 29. 137 28.994 28.898 ..c: 
u� 10 32.238 29.765 29.223 29.036 28.913 28.828 
C/o 
<!) 15 31.470 29.594 29. 14 1 28.979 28.868 28.792 <!) E E '" 20 31.090 29.496 29.092 28.943 28.838 28.769 E=S 25 30.864 29.435 29.059 28.919 28.817 28.752 
TABLE III 
MOTION VECTOR STEGANOGRAPHY PSNR (DB) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a novel new active war­
den steganographic attack called multi-dimensional Discrete 
Spring Transform that is capable of simultaneously defeating 
multiple types of steganographic schemes. We have shown 
how the attack can successfully be applied to video steganog­
raphy where information is encoded in multiple domains of 
the video. The results of the attack indicate that the BER of 
both steganographic schemes is increased to approximately 0.5 
for even a modest DST transform, results also indicate that the 
quality of the cover media is acceptable for all simulated DST 
where the PSNR remains close to 30dB for all cases. 
We would like to reiterate that the strength of the DST 
attack remains in its ease of implementation and the fact that 
it can simultaneously defeat multiple types of steganography 
without significantly impacting the quality of the cover me­
dia. As steganographic schemes continue to increase in their 
sophistication the need for strong yet flexible attacks becomes 
a necessity where the DST presents a viable solution. 
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